A Legal Perspective on the Last Five Years
By: Kenneth Carnesi, Sr., JD
An independent judiciary is the guarantee that law, not power, governs. It rests on the promise that a judge deciding a case will apply the Constitution and the statutes as written, uninfluenced by who sits in the White House, which party controls Congress, or how a ruling will be received on cable news. That promise is the load-bearing wall of the rule of law. Remove it, and every other constitutional protection becomes contingent on politics rather than principle.
Over the past five years, however, a growing body of legal scholars, appellate judges, and even sitting Supreme Court justices across the ideological spectrum have voiced a related but distinct concern: that some federal trial judges have begun using the tools of judicial independence not to apply the law neutrally, but to obstruct policies they personally oppose, regardless of which administration is in office. The complaint is not that courts review executive action — that is their constitutional duty — but that a subset of district judges have stretched procedural and equitable doctrines well past their traditional boundaries to reach outcomes that look less like adjudication and more like governance.
Defining the Line Between Review and Activism
Judicial review, the power to strike down unconstitutional acts, has been settled law since Marbury v. Madison in 1803. Activism, by contrast, is not a formal legal doctrine at all; it is a description of method rather than outcome. A ruling is not activist merely because it blocks a president or a legislature. It becomes activist when a court reaches for a constitutional or equitable theory it need not adopt, when it resolves disputed factual or policy questions more properly left to elected branches, or when it fashions a remedy far broader than the injury the plaintiffs before it actually suffered.
The most visible symptom of this drift has been the explosive growth of the nationwide, or universal, injunction: a single district judge’s order barring enforcement of a federal law or policy against everyone in the country, not merely the parties in the courtroom. Congressional Research Service data show that such injunctions were rare before 2015 but numbered roughly 86 during the first Trump administration, 28 during the Biden administration, and at least 50 in the opening year of the second Trump administration before the Supreme Court intervened. Litigants on both sides learned the same lesson: file in a friendly district, ask for a nationwide order, and a single trial judge can freeze a policy for the whole country while the case winds through years of appeals.
The Supreme Court itself confronted this dynamic directly in Trump v. CASA, Inc., decided June 27, 2025. In a 6–3 decision authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the Court held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 does not empower federal courts to grant relief broader than necessary to redress the injury of the actual plaintiffs before them, and that universal injunctions benefiting nonparties likely exceed the equitable authority Congress has given the federal courts. The ruling did not address the underlying merits of the executive order at issue; it addressed only the scope of the remedy district courts had assumed for themselves. That the Court felt compelled to rein in the practice at all is itself evidence of how far the doctrine had drifted from its historical moorings in English equity practice, where relief ran only to the parties in the suit.
The Mechanisms of Overreach
Several recurring patterns illustrate the trend beyond the injunction question alone. First, forum shopping has become systematized: advocacy groups on both the left and the right now select single-judge divisions where the assigned jurist’s prior rulings make a favorable outcome all but certain, reducing the random assignment of cases to a formality that litigants can engineer around. A lawsuit challenging a federal policy is increasingly filed not in the district with the most obvious connection to the dispute, but in the district with the most obviously sympathetic bench, and often in a division served by only one or two judges, so that the identity of the decision-maker is effectively chosen by the plaintiff rather than assigned by lot.
Second, temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, meant to preserve the status quo pending a full hearing, are increasingly issued with reasoning that resolves the ultimate merits of a case at the earliest possible stage, sometimes within days of filing and without a developed factual record. What was designed as a narrow, provisional tool to prevent irreparable harm while litigation proceeds has, in a growing number of cases, become the final word in practice, since an emergency order that freezes a policy for months or years pending appeal often moots the underlying dispute long before a court ever reaches a considered judgment on the merits.
Third, some courts have reached for sweeping constitutional rulings when narrower statutory or procedural grounds were available, a practice the doctrine of constitutional avoidance was designed to prevent. Each of these mechanisms is individually defensible in isolation; together, and used with increasing frequency, they shift the function of the district court from adjudicating disputes to setting national policy by injunction, and they do so through procedural vehicles that were never intended to bear that much weight.
The Danger to the Right
For conservatives, the immediate and obvious danger is that a single trial judge, sitting in one of ninety-four federal districts and answerable to no electorate, can freeze a lawfully enacted executive order or regulation nationwide, often on the same day it is issued and well before the government has had any chance to defend it on the merits. This transforms the judiciary into a kind of standing veto power over the elected branches, exercised not by nine justices after full briefing but by whichever single judge the plaintiffs’ lawyers manage to draw. When that power is used repeatedly against a single administration’s agenda, the practical effect is to let the losing side of an election relitigate its loss in court, term after term, policy after policy.
The Danger to the Left
For progressives, the same toolkit cuts the other way, and often has. District courts in conservative-leaning circuits used identical procedural devices to block Biden-era immigration policy, student loan relief, and environmental regulation, frequently through the same nationwide injunctions and forum-selected filings that liberal litigants had pioneered during the first Trump administration. A doctrine expanded to serve one political movement rarely stays exclusive to it; courts are not partisan actors with fixed loyalties, and a tool built to frustrate a Republican president will just as readily be picked up to frustrate a Democratic one. Progressives who cheer an expansive use of judicial power today are handing the same instrument to a future court that may be considerably less sympathetic to their goals.
The Structural Danger to Both
Beyond the partisan scorecard, three structural harms threaten the judiciary regardless of who currently benefits from the trend. First, public confidence in courts as neutral arbiters erodes when rulings track predictably with a judge’s appointing president rather than with the strength of the legal argument; polling over the last several years has shown declining public trust in the federal judiciary across party lines, a genuinely bipartisan casualty. A judiciary perceived as simply the third political branch loses the one asset that makes its rulings worth obeying even when they are unpopular: the presumption that it is above the fray.
Second, the practice invites retaliation from the political branches: proposals now circulating in Congress, including the Nationwide Injunction Abuse Prevention Act and the Court Shopping Deterrence Act, would not exist but for the perception that the judiciary needs to be reined in by statute. Whichever party is in the majority when such legislation passes will design it to protect its own agenda and hamstring the other’s, which only accelerates the politicization it purports to fix, and each cycle of court-curbing legislation makes the next one easier to justify. Third, and most corrosively, an executive branch that comes to see the courts as merely another partisan obstacle may begin to test the limits of compliance with unfavorable orders, a far graver threat to the constitutional order than any single injunction, however broad. A government that concludes courts are just another interest group to be outmaneuvered, rather than an authority to be obeyed, has stepped outside the rule of law altogether, regardless of which party holds power when it happens.
A Fair Accounting
It is worth acknowledging that not everyone agrees a crisis exists at all. Many judges, and a substantial number of scholars, view the expansion of injunctive relief as a proportionate response to genuinely aggressive and often hastily drafted executive action, arguing that broad remedies are sometimes the only practical way to prevent irreparable harm before slower appellate review can occur. On this view, the label “activist” is less a neutral description than a partisan epithet, applied by whichever side loses a given ruling and rarely by the side that wins. There is real force to the observation that accusations of judicial overreach have been leveled by both major parties, against judges appointed by presidents of both parties, largely in proportion to whose policies were being blocked at the time. A fair accounting must hold that truth alongside the structural concerns above, rather than treating either side’s account as the whole story.
Restoring the Boundary
Trump v. CASA offers one path forward: enforcing long-standing limits on equitable remedies so that relief matches injury, rather than allowing a single district judge to set national policy from the bench. Complementary reforms, such as routing genuinely nationwide constitutional challenges to three-judge panels with direct appeal to the Supreme Court, and stricter enforcement of standing and venue rules to curb forum shopping, would apply with equal force regardless of which party controls the White House. None of these fixes require abandoning judicial review of executive or legislative action; they require restoring the traditional boundary between deciding a case and dictating a policy.
The rule of law does not depend on courts always ruling in a particular direction; it depends on courts deciding cases the same way regardless of who is in power. Judicial independence was designed to insulate judges from the political branches, not to give any individual judge a freestanding policymaking role of his or her own. Preserving that distinction is not a partisan project. It is the only way the judiciary retains the authority to check either party the next time either party overreaches.
